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KUCANA V. HOLDER AND JUDICIAL REVIEW OF
THE DECISION NOT TO REOPEN SUA SPONTE IN
IMMIGRATION REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS
Michael A. Keough*
Motions to reopen allow aliens facing removal to have their case
reexamined by the Board of Immigration Appeals in light of new evidence
or intervening events, and are an important procedural safeguard in
immigration removal proceedings. Parties may move to reopen, and the
Board may also reopen removal proceedings under its sua sponte authority.
Although federal courts of appeals may review final removal decisions, the
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
(IIRIRA) severely curtailed the ability of federal courts to review final
removal decisions. Prior to 2010, circuits were split on the issue of
whether motions to reopen were reviewable by federal courts in light of
IIRIRA.
In Kucana v. Holder, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a decision to
reopen made pursuant to a party’s motion was reviewable since the
discretion to grant or deny such a motion had derived from a regulation
promulgated by the Attorney General. The Court held that the Executive
could not use regulations alone to change the ability of the federal courts to
review their decisions, but bracketed the issue of whether the decision not
to reopen sua sponte could be reviewed under this same logic. Following
the Court’s decision in 2010, the courts of appeals are divided over whether
such decisions are reviewable; some circuits have determined that they lack
jurisdiction based on pre-Kucana case law, while others have urged a
reconsideration of pre-Kucana decisions in light of the Supreme Court’s
reasoning.
This Note argues that the decision not to reopen sua sponte should be
subject to judicial review under the same reasoning applied in Kucana.
Review of these decisions would also be in line with the Supreme Court’s
movement toward greater judicial review of federal immigration decisions.

* J.D. Candidate, 2013, Fordham University School of Law; M.A., 2010, Herbert H.
Lehman College—City University of New York; B.A., 2008, The George Washington
University. I would like to thank Professor Joseph Landau for his guidance and inspiration,
and Lauren for her support during the long hours that went into this Note.
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INTRODUCTION
Samuel Adebisi Awe came to the United States from Nigeria in 1969 on
a student visa, eventually earning a Ph.D. in agriculture from the University
of Wisconsin. 1 Awe returned to Nigeria in 1994 to serve as that country’s
Commissioner of Agriculture and Rural Development but, having been
plagued by kidney disease all of his life, returned to the United States to
receive medical care. 2 Awe began working as a teacher in Milwaukee and
applied for asylum in 1998, but did not have the proper visa to remain in the
United States and was ordered removed after his asylum claim was denied.3
Awe’s removal order was temporarily delayed so that he could continue to
receive life-saving treatment in the United States.4
Awe filed a motion to reopen his case based on his medical condition,
fear that he would be persecuted for his service in the Nigerian government,
and fear that his daughter would be subjected to genital mutilation upon
their return.5 When this motion failed before the Board of Immigration
Appeals (BIA), Awe appealed to the Seventh Circuit.6 The court, bound by
precedent holding that denials of motions to reopen were unreviewable,
determined that it had no choice but to affirm the removal order. 7 The
circuit opinion concluded with a humanitarian plea, calling on the U.S.
Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) to grant a “deferred action”
so that Awe could remain in the United States and receive care.8 Without
any authority to review the BIA’s decision not to reopen, the Seventh
Circuit could only hope that the “exceptional humanitarian concerns”
present in Awe’s case would inspire the USCIS to act. 9
If circuit courts had the power to review the BIA’s decision not to use its
sua sponte power to reopen, the Seventh Circuit would not have been
powerless to do justice in Awe’s case. Immigrants like Samuel Awe, who
are trying to start a new life in America or flee persecution abroad, face
serious consequences, such as forced removal from the U.S. and separation
from their families, when they do not prevail in their removal
proceedings. 10 At the end of a removal proceeding, if new facts come to
1. See Awe v. Holder, 340 F. App’x 341, 343 (7th Cir. 2009).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 343–44.
5. See id. at 344.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 346.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. See Robert A. Katzmann, Deepening the Legal Profession’s Pro Bono Commitment
to the Immigrant Poor, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 453, 453–54 (2009) (noting the dire
consequences of removal for immigrants).
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light or a change in the law occurs that would have altered the outcome of
the case, an alien11 may file a motion to reopen the case. 12 The agency has
the discretion to grant or deny the motion. 13 Prior to the U.S. Supreme
Court’s decision in Kucana v. Holder, 14 circuit courts disagreed over
whether the BIA’s decision to reopen was discretionary under the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 15 (IIRIRA),
and thus unreviewable by federal courts as part of that law’s jurisdictionstripping provisions, or made discretionary by regulation, and thus subject
to review. 16
Kucana settled this question by holding that decisions made discretionary
by statutes were not subject to judicial review where IIRIRA’s jurisdictionstripping provisions applied, but those made discretionary solely through a
regulation were subject to review.17 Some discretion, such as the BIA’s
ability to admit an alien despite criminal convictions that would otherwise
render her inadmissible, is granted by Congress through statute and can be
placed beyond the purview of the courts if Congress so desires. 18 Other
discretion, such as the regulation defining the power to reopen, which was
at issue in Kucana, is created by regulations of the Attorney General and
cannot be removed from the jurisdiction of the courts. 19 In Kucana, the
Court noted that Congress has the authority to limit judicial review through
appropriate legislation, but allowing regulations to affect judicial review
gives the Executive Branch an unconstitutional power to limit review of its
own decisions. 20
The Court did not answer the question of whether a decision not to
reopen sua sponte could be subject to judicial review.21 The BIA exercises
its sua sponte power when it reopens a case on its own motion. 22 In the
wake of Kucana, the First, Second, Third, Fifth, Eighth, Tenth, and
Eleventh Circuits have affirmed pre-Kucana case law and held that they do

11. The word “alien,” although it is the legal term used to describe persons located
within the United States who have not yet been naturalized, has also been used in a
pejorative context against immigrants seeking to enter the United States. Title 8 of the U.S.
Code defines “alien” as “any person not a citizen or national of the United States.” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(3) (2006). The term is used within this Note solely to describe a legal status.
12. See 18B JILL GUSTAFSON ET AL., FEDERAL PROCEDURE, LAWYERS EDITION § 45:1631
(Francis M. Dougherty ed., 2009); see also In re X-G-W-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 71, 74 (B.I.A.
1998) (reopening sua sponte where new statutory definition of alien’s status was enacted
after the initial BIA decision).
13. See 18A GUSTAFSON ET AL., supra note 12, § 45:1193.
14. 130 S. Ct. 827 (2010).
15. Pub. L. 104-208, div. C, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 8 U.S.C.).
16. See Kucana, 130 S. Ct. at 827–28.
17. See id. at 839–40.
18. Id.
19. See id.
20. Id.
21. Cf. id. at 831.
22. 5 CHARLES GORDON ET AL., IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 64.03(4)(b)
(2011).

2012]

KUCANA AND SUA SPONTE MOTIONS TO REOPEN

2079

not have jurisdiction over sua sponte motions to reopen. 23 Panels in the
Third, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits have urged revisiting and potentially
overturning pre-Kucana cases in light of the Supreme Court’s reasoning, or
have suggested new standards by which these decisions can be reviewed. 24
Whether the BIA’s decision not to reopen sua sponte can be reviewed by a
federal court is the focus of this Note.
Part I of this Note outlines U.S. immigration law and the role of motions
to reopen in removal proceedings. In Part II, this Note considers the state
of the law after Kucana. Finally, Part III argues that the Supreme Court
should allow judicial review of the BIA’s decision not to reopen sua sponte,
and that allowing this review is in line with the Court’s broad trend toward
permitting judicial review of agency decisions in the immigration realm.
I. REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS, IMMIGRATION POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES,
AND IIRIRA
Part I discusses motions to reopen within the context of removal
proceedings before the BIA. It also places the Kucana decision in the
historical context of judicial review of federal immigration decisions,
beginning in the late nineteenth century with the Chinese Exclusion Act and
the announcement of the plenary powers doctrine. Finally, Part I outlines
the passage of IIRIRA, which led to the question of jurisdiction at issue in
Kucana.
A. Removal Proceedings and the Board of Immigration Appeals
1. Removal Procedure
Removal proceedings 25 begin with service of a Notice to Appear
(NTA). 26 The NTA contains a notice of the alien’s rights and the charges
to which he or she must respond, as well as a brief statement of the
government’s reasons for bringing the action. 27 The Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) must also then decide whether the alien will be
detained during the period of the removal proceeding, which can last

23. See, e.g., Bakanovas v. Holder, 438 F. App’x 717, 722 (10th Cir. 2011); BustilloMartinez v. Holder, 431 F. App’x 265, 266–67 (5th Cir. 2011); Ozeiry v. Att’y Gen., 400 F.
App’x 647, 649–50 (3d Cir. 2010); Gashi v. Holder, 382 F. App’x 21, 22–23 (2d Cir. 2010);
Neves v. Holder, 613 F.3d 30, 33 (1st Cir. 2010); Ochoa v. Holder, 604 F.3d 546, 549–50
(8th Cir. 2010); ; Jaimes-Aguirre v. Att’y Gen., 369 F. App’x 101, 103 (11th Cir. 2010); see
also infra Part II.A.
24. See, e.g., Pllumi v. Att’y Gen., 642 F.3d 155, 159–60 (3d Cir. 2011); MejiaHernandez v. Holder, 633 F.3d 818, 823–24 (9th Cir. 2011); Gor v. Holder, 607 F.3d 180,
190 (6th Cir. 2010); see also infra Part II.B.
25. Under IIRIRA, what were formerly known as “deportation” proceedings and
“exclusion” proceedings are now collectively known as “removal” proceedings. See
STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY & CRISTINA M. RODRÍGUEZ, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND
POLICY 648 (5th ed. 2009).
26. 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a) (2006); LEGOMSKY & RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 25, at 650.
27. RICHARD A. BOSWELL, ESSENTIALS OF IMMIGRATION LAW 40–41 (2d ed. 2009).
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anywhere from a few months to many years. 28 Although aliens in removal
proceedings have a right to representation by counsel if they choose, they
do not have the right to have an attorney provided to them if they cannot
afford one. 29
An Immigration Judge (IJ) presides over the removal proceeding.30
Removal proceedings may take place in person or via videoconference, and
are open to the public at the discretion of the IJ. 31 At the beginning of the
proceeding, the IJ must determine if the alien is aware of his or her right to
be represented by counsel.32 After this, the alien must admit or deny the
facts of the allegations against him or her. 33 If he or she admits the
allegations, the hearing is complete and the IJ can order removal. 34 If the
alien denies the allegations, the IJ conducts an evidentiary hearing to
establish the facts underlying the charges. 35 At the end of the hearing, the
IJ determines whether the alien is removable based solely on the facts
established in the hearing. 36
2. The Board of Immigration Appeals
The alien has the right to appeal the IJ’s decision to the BIA. The BIA
acts on behalf of the Attorney General as the highest administrative court
for immigration and nationality matters.37 The Board has jurisdiction over
all decisions of immigration courts and certain other decisions of the
DHS. 38 The fifteen members of the BIA sit in Falls Church, Virginia, and
are appointed by the Attorney General. 39 The BIA is part of the Executive
Office for Immigration Review, which reports directly to the Attorney

28. LEGOMSKY & RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 25, at 651.
29. Id. at 654. Whether ineffective assistance of counsel can be grounds for a motion to
reopen has been the subject of disagreement among Attorneys General. In 2009, Attorney
General Michael Mukasey held that ineffective assistance of counsel was not grounds for a
motion to reopen because there is no constitutional right to counsel in immigration cases. See
In re Compean, 24 I. & N. Dec. 710, 720–21 (A.G.), vacated, 25 I. & N. Dec. 1 (A.G. 2009);
1 GORDON ET AL., supra note 22, § 4.01. His successor, Eric Holder, vacated this decision,
giving the BIA discretion to reopen based on ineffective assistance of counsel, and the
Department of Justice solicited public comment for new regulations on ineffective assistance
of counsel as grounds for a motion to reopen. See Compean, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 2–3; 1
GORDON ET AL., supra note 22, § 4.01(4).
30. LEGOMSKY & RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 25, at 654.
31. AUSTIN T. FRAGOMEN, JR. & STEVEN C. BELL, IMMIGRATION FUNDAMENTALS: A
GUIDE TO LAW AND PRACTICE § 7:5.3 (2011).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, BD. OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS PRACTICE
MANUAL 1 (2004) [hereinafter BIA PRACTICE MANUAL], available at
http://www.justice.gov/eoir/vll/qapracmanual/pracmanual/tocfull.pdf.
38. Id. at 1–2.
39. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(a)(1) (2011); LEGOMSKY & RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 25, at 657.
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General. 40 Since the BIA and IJs are part of the Justice Department, DHS
must appear as a party to bring claims before an IJ or the Board. 41
The BIA reviews factual findings of the IJ under a clearly erroneous
standard. 42 Questions of law are reviewed de novo. 43 Cases brought before
the BIA are first evaluated by a screening panel, which refers them either to
a single Board member or to a three-member panel. 44 The single Board
member may issue a two-sentence “affirmance without opinion,” or write
an order that includes a more detailed explanation of the ruling. 45 Threemember panels consider cases to correct inconsistencies among rulings of
different IJs, establish precedent for a rule or statute, review a decision of
an IJ that lacks conformity with precedent, correct clearly erroneous factual
determinations of an IJ, or review any other case that would be
inappropriate for a single Board member to review. 46 If a case is referred to
a panel of three Board members, the panel will issue a formal written
decision that becomes the final order of the BIA in that case.47
Although the Department of Justice has developed procedures to ensure
uniform application of immigration laws, circuit courts have expressed
doubt about the quality of justice administered by the BIA and IJs. In
Benslimane v. Gonzales, 48 the Seventh Circuit criticized the actions of the
BIA as falling “below the minimum standards of legal justice.” 49 The
Seventh Circuit also noted that when corrections must be made, the cases
are returned to the Attorney General, the party who was initially responsible
for the inadequate proceedings. 50 Since many IJ decisions are now
affirmed by a single Board member without any formal opinion, circuit
court frustration sometimes extends to failed processes at the IJ level.51 In
one case, the Second Circuit went so far as to remand to “an IJ other than IJ
Chase” and encouraged the Board to reexamine sua sponte all of that IJ’s
recent decisions. 52 In light of these criticisms, in 2006, Attorney General
Alberto Gonzales announced twenty-two procedures aimed at increasing the

40. BIA PRACTICE MANUAL, supra note 37, at 2.
41. Id.
42. FRAGOMEN & BELL, supra note 31, § 8:2.2.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. 1 GORDON ET AL., supra note 22, § 3.05(6)(b)(i).
46. FRAGOMEN & BELL, supra note 31, § 8:2.2.
47. Id.
48. 430 F.3d 828 (7th Cir. 2005).
49. See id. at 830. The Seventh Circuit noted that it was unclear whether this was
caused by budget constraints or by another factor outside of the BIA’s control. See id.; see
also Michele Benedetto, Crisis on the Immigration Bench: An Ethical Perspective, 28 J.
NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 471, 474 (2008) (arguing that poor judicial ethics was the
root cause of the crisis).
50. See Benslimane, 430 F.3d at 830.
51. See LEGOMSKY & RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 25, at 748.
52. See Ba v. Gonzales, 228 F. App’x 7, 11 (2d Cir. 2007). The court noted that IJ
Chase’s language and demeanor had “erode[d] the appearance of fairness and call[ed] into
question the results of the proceeding. Id. at 11; see also LEGOMSKY & RODRÍGUEZ, supra
note 25, at 748.
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effectiveness and integrity of BIA decisions, including the use of
affirmances without opinion and strict time limits for BIA decisions.53
Criticism did not end with the addition of these procedures, however.
The reduction of size from twenty-three Board members to eleven in 2002
resulted in the reassignment of many Board members that had routinely
ruled in favor of aliens seeking to avoid deportation without any criteria for
selecting which Board members would be reassigned. 54 Some scholars
have argued that this “purge of the liberals” undermines the idea that the
BIA is insulated from political pressure. 55 Others have noted that outside
pressures, such as conflicting or unclear laws and the lack of robust judicial
review of BIA decisions, and not political meddling, have created the
“immigration adjudication crisis.” 56
3. Motions to Reopen
A motion to reopen allows an alien, on behalf of herself, or the Attorney
General, on behalf of the U.S. government, to challenge a decision of the
BIA. 57 If, after a final removal order, new evidence is discovered or
intervening events occur (such as an event in the alien’s home country or a
change in U.S. law), a party to the removal may move to reopen the
proceedings so that the BIA can reconsider the case and take into account
the new evidence. 58 A motion to reopen must be made within ninety days
of the BIA’s decision; otherwise, the party bringing the motion must show
that the delay was “reasonable and . . . beyond the control of the applicant
or petitioner.” 59 When the BIA considers the motion, the alien must
provide affidavits showing a prima facie case for the relief sought, or else
the motion to reopen will be denied. 60 These motions may be appealed to
the circuit courts, 61 which were split on the scope of that review prior to the
Kucana decision. 62
When the Board decides to reopen a case where the formal requirements
of a motion to reopen have not been met, it does so through its sua sponte

53. FRAGOMEN & BELL, supra note 31, § 8:2.2; see also LEGOMSKY & RODRÍGUEZ, supra
note 25, at 748–49.
54. See id. at 750–51; Stephen H. Legomsky, Deportation and the War on
Independence, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 369, 376 (2006) (citing Peter J. Levinson, The Facade of
Quasi-judicial Independence in Immigration Appellate Adjudications, 9 BENDER’S IMMIGR.
BULL. 1154, 1164 (2004)). The BIA was increased to its current fifteen-member size
through a 2006 interim rule that was finalized in 2008. See 73 Fed. Reg. 33,875 (2008); 71
Fed. Reg. 70,885 (2006).
55. See LEGOMSKY & RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 25, at 751.
56. See, e.g., Jill E. Family, Beyond Decisional Independence: Uncovering Contributors
to the Immigration Adjudication Crisis, 59 U. KAN. L. REV. 541, 541–42 (2011).
57. See GUSTAFSON, supra note 12, § 45:1631.
58. BOSWELL, supra note 27, at 164.
59. 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i) (2011); see also BOSWELL, supra note 27, at 164–65.
60. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2; BOSWELL, supra note 27, at 165 (citing INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S.
94, 104 (1988)).
61. See infra note 124 and accompanying text.
62. See infra Part I.E.
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power to reopen matters before it. 63 Pursuant to regulations promulgated
by the Attorney General, the BIA may use its sua sponte power in
“exceptional situations,” but may not use the power as “a general cure for
filing defects or to otherwise circumvent the regulations, where enforcing
them might result in hardship.” 64 For example, when new information or a
change in law occurs after the ninety-day window for filing the motion has
elapsed, the requirements for the motion have not been met. 65 In this
situation, however, the BIA would be able to reopen sua sponte even
though a party would be precluded from moving to reopen.66 The
Department of Justice has cited sua sponte reopening as a comparable
stand-in for a range of remedies. For example, following public comment
on a related rule, the Department declined to adopt a proposed “good cause
exception” for those cases that “[fell] beyond [the] rule’s time and number
limitations,” noting that the ability to reopen sua sponte provides a
comparable procedural remedy in these situations. 67
The BIA has broad discretion under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) to reopen
proceedings under its sua sponte authority, just as it has broad discretion to
grant or deny motions to reopen when the motion is made by the parties. 68
Two cases illustrate the breadth of the BIA’s discretion to exercise sua
sponte authority to reopen. In In re X-G-W-, 69 the BIA exercised its sua
sponte authority when the statutory definition of “refugee” was changed to
arguably include an alien whose situation was not contemplated under the
prior definition, even though the alien’s own motion to reopen was
untimely. 70 This change in the law represented an “exceptional situation”
warranting reopening; upon reopening, the BIA withheld removal. 71 In
contrast, the BIA declined to exercise sua sponte jurisdiction in In re
G-D-. 72 There, an alien claimed that the Board’s intervening decision in In
re O-Z- & I-Z-, 73 in which it found that a Ukrainian had a well-founded fear
of persecution in Ukraine based on past religious persecution, 74 required
63. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a); see also BOSWELL, supra note 27, at 166.
64. In re J-J-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 976, 984 (B.I.A. 1997).
65. See 1 GORDON ET AL., supra note 22, § 3.05.
66. See id.
67. Executive Office for Immigration Review; Motions and Appeals in Immigration
Proceedings, 61 Fed. Reg. 18,900, 18,902 (Apr. 29, 1996) (codified at 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2).
68. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a); Anne J. Greer & Teresa L. Donovan, Immigration Law in
Motion—The Changing Landscape of Motions for Continuance, Change of Venue,
Reopening, Remand, and Reconsideration Before the Immigration Judges, the Board of
Immigration Appeals, and the Federal Circuit Courts, IMMIGR. BRIEFINGS, Oct. 2007, at 1.
69. 22 I. & N. Dec. 71 (B.I.A. 1998), overruled by In re G-C-L-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 359
(B.I.A. 2002).
70. See id. at 74. The BIA’s policy of granting untimely motions for refugee status
based solely on coercive population control policies, first espoused in In re X-G-W-, was
abandoned in 2002. See In re G-C-L-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 359. For an example of a sua
sponte reopening that is still good law (although unpublished and not precedential), see
generally In re Cuares-Tito, No. A098 966 923, 2011 WL 3443890 (B.I.A. July 8, 2011)
(reopening sua sponte where an IJ followed improper procedures in denying a motion).
71. See In re X-G-W-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 74.
72. 22 I. & N. Dec. 1132 (B.I.A. 1999).
73. 22 I. & N. Dec. 23 (B.I.A. 1998).
74. See In re O-Z- & I-Z-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 27.
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reopening despite G-D-’s untimely motion. 75 The Board held that the
decision in O-Z- & I-Z- was an application of existing law to the specific
facts of that case and not a fundamental intervening change in immigration
law that would require the Board to reopen G-D-’s case under its own
authority. 76
B. Judicial Power in the Executive and the Courts
Kucana’s complex questions about discretion arise from Congress’s
ability to give judicial powers to the Executive and to limit the
circumstances under which courts can review those decisions. Although
Article III vests the “judicial power” in the Supreme Court, Congress may
create executive tribunals, such as the BIA, that have the authority to
exercise judicial power. Congress may also limit the ability of federal
courts to review the decisions of these executive tribunals.
1. When Congress Can Delegate Authority to an Agency
The Constitution does not give the judicial branch a “monopoly” over the
power of adjudication. 77 In order to ensure effective administration of the
law, Congress may grant to the Executive the power to form tribunals that
have the power to adjudicate disputes.78 The Supreme Court, in Crowell v.
Benson, 79 rejected a challenge to the constitutionality of administrative
hearings to determine admiralty compensation claims, and permitted
Congress to place adjudicatory power in the hands of the Executive. 80 This
power can be wielded by both administrative agencies and “Article I
courts,” executive tribunals given judicial power through acts of
Congress. 81 Congress can grant administrative tribunals discretionary

75. See id. at 1132–33.
76. See id. at 1135–36.
77. Gerald L. Neuman, Jurisdiction and the Rule of Law After the 1996 Immigration Act,
113 HARV. L. REV. 1963, 1969 (2000). But see Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1
Wheat.) 304, 328 (1816) (noting that Congress must vest the “whole judicial power” in the
federal courts); Robert N. Clinton, A Mandatory View of Federal Court Jurisdiction: A
Guided Quest for the Original Understanding of Article III, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 741, 749–50
(1984) (arguing that Article III vests mandatory jurisdiction for every claim in some federal
court).
78. Neuman, supra note 77, at 1969. Article III courts typically have greater power over
“private rights” disputes between two individuals, whereas noncriminal “public rights”
disputes between an individual and the government can be adjudicated by executive
tribunals. Id. at 1969–70 (citing Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 50–52 (1932)).
79. 285 U.S. 22.
80. See id. at 64–65; see also Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the
Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1374–79
(1953).
81. RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART & WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 339 (6th ed. 2009).

2012]

KUCANA AND SUA SPONTE MOTIONS TO REOPEN

2085

powers by statute, 82 or such tribunals may acquire their powers by
executive regulation. 83
Although giving adjudicatory power to the relevant agency may make for
more efficient administration of the law, the act of granting judicial power
to the Executive rightly raises separation of powers concerns, since
executive agencies may be performing judicial functions without the
oversight of the judicial branch. 84 One method of easing this tension
between efficiency and separation of powers is to allow courts to review the
decisions of these executive tribunals. 85
2. When Congress Can Limit Jurisdiction of Article III Courts
The Supreme Court has long held that Congress cannot change the
original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, but does have the power to limit
the appellate jurisdiction of Article III courts. 86 The “Madisonian
Compromise” gave Congress the power to determine the jurisdiction of
lower federal courts. 87 In Lauf v. E.G. Shinner & Co., 88 the Supreme Court
affirmed the principle that Congress is permitted to limit the jurisdiction of
Article III courts to hear certain types of cases. 89 The Lauf Court rejected a
constitutional challenge to the Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932, which
prevented federal courts from hearing claims related to “yellow dog”
contracts, agreements that prohibited employees from unionizing as a
condition of employment. 90 More recently, in Ankenbrandt v. Richards,91
the Court upheld Congress’s power to prevent federal courts from
exercising diversity jurisdiction in cases involving “domestic relations.”92

82. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(3) (2006) (granting discretion to the Attorney General
to cancel the removal of a permanent resident who has not been convicted of an aggravated
felony).
83. See, e.g., 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) (2011) (granting the BIA discretion to reopen a
removal proceeding, through a regulation promulgated by the Attorney General).
84. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and
Article III, 101 HARV. L. REV. 915, 938 (1988) (“The underlying constitutional conception is
that wielders of governmental power must be subject to the limits of law, and that the
applicable limits should be determined, not by those institutions whose authority is in
question, but by an impartial judiciary.”).
85. See Neuman, supra note 77, at 1969–70.
86. See Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 513–14 (1868) (holding that when
Congress removes jurisdiction from the federal courts through statute, the Supreme Court is
prevented from hearing a related claim); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174–
76 (1803) (holding that Congress cannot alter the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court).
87. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 81, at 288.
88. 303 U.S. 323 (1938).
89. See id. at 330.
90. See id. at 325–27; FALLON ET AL., supra note 81, at 292–93.
91. 504 U.S. 689 (1992).
92. See id. at 697–702; FALLON ET AL., supra note 81, at 294. A separate controversy
exists over whether Article III courts can be denied jurisdiction over a particular claim if
state courts are unable to hear that claim. See id. at 290–92. Because the power to remove is
vested solely in the federal government, however, this Note will not address the availability
of relief through state courts.
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The jurisdiction-stripping provisions of IIRIRA were another example of
Congress’s power to alter the jurisdiction of Article III courts.93
C. Immigration Policy in the United States and the Rise and Fall
of the Plenary Power Doctrine
The decision in Kucana was made against the background of more than
100 years of Supreme Court immigration jurisprudence. This section first
discusses the plenary power doctrine and the great deference that courts
have shown the Executive in immigration matters. It then discuss the more
recent trend of finding room within this doctrine for judicial review of some
immigration decisions.
Although the Constitution gives Congress the power to regulate
immigration matters, 94 American immigration regulations mostly originated
at the state and local level until after the Civil War. 95 Early American
immigration policy has been described as “immigration as a transition,”
because prevailing attitudes assumed that all immigrants would become
naturalized citizens and that the status of being a new immigrant was
merely a stepping-stone to inevitable naturalization. 96 This attitude
changed in the late nineteenth century, as the demographics and size of the
immigrant population increased; once permissive views of immigration
changed as well. 97 As a response, the Page Act 98 became the first modern
immigration law in 1875, restricting entry of Chinese women under the
pretense of regulating prostitution.99 The Chinese Exclusion Act followed
in 1882, imposing a ten-year moratorium on the entry of Chinese laborers
into the United States. 100
Conflict between the federal judiciary and Congress over the federal
courts’ proper jurisdiction over immigration matters dates back to the
period of the Page Act and the Chinese Exclusion Act. In 1891, Congress
passed a law to make agency removal decisions “final” and prevent appeals

93. See infra Part I.D.
94. The Constitution expressly authorizes Congress “to establish an uniform Rule of
Naturalization,” but is otherwise silent on the subject of immigration policy. U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 8; see also An Act to Establish an Uniform Rule of Naturalization, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 103
(1790) (repealed 1795).
95. Hiroshi Motomura, The Rights of Others: Legal Claims and Immigration Outside
the Law, 59 DUKE L.J. 1723, 1729 (2010) (noting that because regulating migration would
have required the federal government to answer questions about the movement of slaves and
free blacks, the federal government did little in the area of immigration law until the Civil
War had settled the slavery question).
96. See HIROSHI MOTOMURA, AMERICANS IN WAITING: THE LOST STORY OF
IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES 8–9 (2006).
97. See id. at 19–21. Prior to 1830, most immigration to the United States came from
Great Britain and Western Europe. Id. at 19. In the mid- and late nineteenth century, the
immigrant population exploded and included immigrants from Ireland, Germany, and Asia.
Id. at 19–20.
98. ch. 141, 18 Stat. 477 (1875).
99. Id. at 25.
100. Id. at 25–26.
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of these decisions to the federal courts.101 Supreme Court decisions of this
period also reflected non-citizens’ limited ability to challenge immigration
proceedings in court because of the plenary power doctrine—the Court’s
strong deference to the power of the Executive and Congress in the
immigration realm.102 The Court continued to give deference to Congress
and the Executive under the plenary power doctrine well into the twentieth
century.103
Beginning in 1953, the Court began to rule that, notwithstanding the
plenary power doctrine, non-citizens facing removal are entitled to minimal
due process even if, as a substantive matter, the Court cannot address
policies set by Congress and the Executive.104 The Court held that
immigrants who chose to affiliate themselves with the United States have a
right to receive basic due process in the procedures that decide whether they
will be removed or allowed to stay.105
Two cases—Mathews v. Eldridge106 in 1976 and Landon v. Plasencia107
in 1982—affirmed that judicial review of administrative procedures is an
important due process concern and, in doing so, staked out space for
judicial review as an exception to the plenary power doctrine.108 In
Mathews, a case concerning Social Security benefits, the Court created a
three-factor balancing test to determine whether administrative hearings
meet due process standards: (1) the individual’s interest in process, (2) the
government’s interest in fewer procedures, and (3) the costs and benefits of
mandating additional procedures.109 Although Mathews did not address
immigration proceedings, it held that any administrative proceeding must

101. Id. at 32. At the time, final orders of removal could only be reviewed by the
Superintendent of Immigration and the Secretary of the Treasury, because the modern Board
of Immigration Appeals would not be created until 1940. See Regulations Governing
Departmental Organization and Authority, 5 Fed. Reg. 3502 (Sept. 4, 1940).
102. MOTOMURA, supra note 96, at 27. See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S.
698, 731–32 (1893) (holding that immigration proceedings were political decisions not
subject to due process claims), Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 663–64 (1892) (holding
that immigrants seeking admission for the first time cannot claim due process protections),
Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889)
(upholding the Chinese Exclusion Act’s provision that Chinese laborers who had left the
United States before the act was passed would not be allowed to reenter if they returned).
103. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy 338 U.S. 537, 542 (1950)
(rejecting an immigrant’s due process challenge and affirming that the ability to exclude
noncitizens was a fundamental sovereign act).
104. See Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 285–86 (1966) (establishing a higher standard of
proof in a removal proceeding); Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 603 (1953)
(holding that an immigrant with ties to the United States was entitled to a hearing); see also
MOTOMURA, supra note 96, at 102. Neither of these cases actually reached the underlying
constitutional issue and were decided on the facts of each case. See MOTOMURA, supra note
96, at 104. The Court had previously required a constitutional minimum due process in
Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86 (1903), but “found that the procedures in question were
sufficient.” Id. at 101–02; see also MOTOMURA, supra note 96, at 104.
105. See MOTOMURA, supra note 96, at 102–05.
106. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
107. 459 U.S. 21 (1982).
108. See MOTOMURA, supra note 96, at 104–05.
109. See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335; MOTOMURA, supra note 96, at 104.
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meet minimum due process standards. 110 In Plasencia, the Court held that
returning lawful immigrants are entitled to procedural due process in
immigration proceedings, even if they are outside the country when they
challenge their removal. 111 Although the Executive retains power over
immigrants seeking to enter the country for the first time, those that have
spent time in the United States are treated differently and executive actions
toward them must meet minimum due process requirements. 112 Taken
together, the broad affirmation of judicial review in Mathews and the
specific application of judicial review to immigration removal proceedings
in Plasencia make clear that the Executive’s immigration-related decisions
are not categorically excluded from judicial review.113
D. IIRIRA
One of the central conflicts in the debate over judicial review of
immigration proceedings is the question of how much discretion should be
given to the BIA in removal proceedings. This conflict peaked in 1996
with the passage of the IIRIRA, 114 the statute at issue in Kucana.115
Through IIRIRA, Congress sought to curtail the jurisdiction of federal
courts to review removal decisions of the BIA. 116 Prior to 1996, Congress
had repeatedly made “empty threats” against the jurisdiction of federal
courts over controversial issues but had declined to curtail that
jurisdiction. 117 In 1996, however, the passage of both IIRIRA and the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996118 (AEDPA) limited
the ability of federal courts to review various forms of executive action in
removal proceedings. 119 Judicial review of removal orders had arguably
reduced the speed by which these orders could be carried out, and Congress
sought to expedite this process by limiting judicial review. 120 For
110. MOTOMURA, supra note 96, at 104.
111. See Plascencia, 459 U.S. at 32 (citing Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 770
(1950)).
112. See id. at 38–41; MOTOMURA, supra note 96, at 104–05.
113. See supra notes 108–12 and accompanying text.
114. See LEGOMSKY & RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 25, at 756 (characterizing the passage of
IIRIRA as an “all out war” in the field of immigration law); cf. Louise Weinberg, The Article
III Box: The Power of “Congress” to Attack the “Jurisdiction” of “Federal Courts,” 78
TEX. L. REV. 1405, 1407–09 (2000) (arguing that the Supreme Court, and not Congress, is
the primary source of limits on the jurisdiction of federal courts).
115. Kucana v. Holder, 130 S. Ct. 827, 831 (2010); see infra Part I.E.
116. LEGOMSKY & RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 25, at 756–57.
117. David Cole, Jurisdiction and Liberty: Habeas Corpus and Due Process as Limits on
Congress’s Control of Federal Jurisdiction, 86 GEO. L.J. 2481, 2482 (1998).
118. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8,
18, 22, 28 and 42 U.S.C.)
119. Cole, supra note 117, at 2482–83.
120. Lenni B. Benson, The New World of Judicial Review of Removal Orders, 12 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 233, 234 n.6 (1998) [hereinafter Benson, New World] (citing Lenni B. Benson,
Back to the Future: Congress Attacks the Right to Judicial Review of Immigration
Proceedings, 29 CONN. L. REV. 1411, 1439–43 (1997)) (observing that Congress “apparently
believed” that removals were being delayed due to the availability of judicial review).
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“disfavored groups,” such as certain criminals and those lacking medical
certification, Congress eliminated the express right of judicial review in the
INA and sought to “insulate” expedited review processes from review. 121
Although the statute intended to increase the speed at which claims were
processed and to encourage immigrants to follow established procedures,
IIRIRA’s goals have been criticized as “draconian” and “the culmination of
over a decade of a progressively and increasingly unkind, ungenerous, and
corrosive isolationist mentality wholly at odds with the vision of an utopic
America.” 122
IIRIRA’s new provisions eliminated the previous distinction between
exclusion orders and deportation orders, consolidating these under the
heading of removal orders. 123 An alien can file a petition for review before
a court of appeals when there is a “final order” in his or her case.124 Within
thirty days, the alien must file the petition for review in the court of appeals
that sits in the location where the removal hearing was held. 125 When a
removal order is entered in absentia, the alien must file a motion to reopen
within 180 days, which is the only relief available to prevent removal. 126
IIRIRA also sought to preclude judicial review of discretionary decisions
made by the BIA and the Attorney General.127 In some areas, such as
IIRIRA’s provisions for granting waivers, Congress specifically precluded
all review by federal courts. 128 In other areas, such as IIRIRA’s provisions
for motions to reopen, Congress noted specific instances where federal
courts do not have jurisdiction to review BIA removal orders. 129
Under IIRIRA, service of the petition for review no longer automatically
stays a removal proceeding, as it had done previously; thus, most petitions
for review are coupled with a motion for a stay of removal pending
121. Id. at 244, 246.
122. Berta Esperanza Hernandez-Truyol & Kimberly A. Johns, Global Rights, Local
Wrongs, and Legal Fixes: An International Human Rights Critique of Immigration and
Welfare “Reform,” 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 547, 550 (1998).
123. Benson, New World, supra note 120, at 235. Prior to IIRIRA’s passage, the
government initiated exclusion proceedings to keep an alien from entering the country, and
deportation proceedings to remove an alien already present in the United States. See
1 GORDON ET AL., supra note 22, § 1.03(2)(b).
124. Benson, New World, supra note 120, at 236.
125. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (2006); see also LEGOMSKY & RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 25, at 761
(citing 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(2)); Benson, New World, supra note 120, at 236–37 (citing 8
U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1)).
126. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(C); see also Benson, New World, supra note 120, at 250.
127. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii); see also Benson, New World, supra note 120, at 240–
41. Grants of asylum were not included in the types of discretionary relief that were no
longer subject to judicial review. See id. at 240.
128. The waiver provision reads in pertinent part: “No court shall have jurisdiction to
review a decision of the Attorney General to grant or deny a waiver under this paragraph.” 8
U.S.C. § 1182(d)(12)(A); see also Benson, New World, supra note 120, at 241.
129. The motion to reopen provision reads in pertinent part: “No court shall have
jurisdiction to review . . . any other decision or action of the Attorney General . . . the
authority for which is specified under this subchapter.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B); see also
Benson, New World, supra note 120, at 241. From this discrepancy, Professor Benson
concluded, “[I]f Congress intended to preclude all review, including statutory eligibility, it
should have just done so with stronger language, as it had in other provisions of the Act.” Id.
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decision. 130 This provision, coupled with BIA reforms enacted by the
Attorney General in 2002, 131 caused a large increase in the number of cases
decided by the BIA each year. 132 The 2002 streamlining procedures
allowed for one member of the BIA to issue a summary affirmance to
dispose of a case instead of hearing the case before a panel of BIA
members. 133
With many post-IIRIRA cases involving novel legal issues that are
inadequately addressed in a short, single-member opinion, the only avenue
of review was to a federal court.134 This increase in immigration cases
before the appellate courts has been described as a “surge” that represents a
“backfir[ing]” of the goals of IIRIRA, since the increase in appeals
lengthens the time it takes to resolve a case instead of shortening it.135
Despite the increased number of appeals filed, most immigration cases
arguably involve a discretionary form of relief for which review was closed
by IIRIRA. This spike in BIA decisions, coupled with a large decrease in
the types of cases that the courts of appeals could actually review,
represented a notable shift of adjudicatory power from the judiciary to the
Executive. 136 Thus, perhaps the most important consequence of IIRIRA’s
jurisdiction-stripping provisions was courts’ determinations of what types

130. LEGOMSKY & RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 25, at 761. Professors Legomsky and
Rodríguez also note that the increase in motions before the courts of appeals poses “difficult
questions of judicial administration,” because coupling a petition for removal with a motion
for stay of a removal proceeding, in most cases, increases the number of motions that a court
must consider. Id.
131. See Board of Immigration Appeals: Procedural Reforms to Improve Case
Management, 67 Fed. Reg. 54,878 (Aug. 26, 2002) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 3); Lenni
B. Benson, Making Paper Dolls: How Restrictions on Judicial Review and the
Administrative Process Increase Immigration Cases in the Federal Courts, 51 N.Y.L. SCH.
L. REV. 37, 44 (2007) (noting that the 2002 reforms were intended to reduce backlog and
streamline case management procedures at the BIA).
132. LEGOMSKY & RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 25, at 758–59. In the Ninth Circuit, 896
immigration cases were filed in 2001 before the BIA reforms were implemented; in 2002
and 2003, there were 3,578 cases and 4,206 cases, respectively. Id. at 758. Legomsky and
Rodríguez also note that the larger volume of BIA dispositions, coupled with the possibility
for lower quality BIA jurisprudence as a result of this volume, has led to a marked increase
in the number of petitions for review before the courts of appeals. Id. at 759–60 (citing John
R.B. Palmer, Stephen W. Yale-Loehr, & Elizabeth Cronin, Why Are So Many People
Challenging Board of Immigration Appeals Decisions in Federal Court? An Empirical
Analysis of the Recent Surge in Petitions for Review, 20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1 (2005)).
133. See Benson, supra note 131, at 46.
134. Id. at 46–47 (noting that the reforms heightened the complexity of legal issues
arising in removal proceedings and thus increased the need for review by the courts of
appeals).
135. Id. at 47–48.
136. Benson, New World, supra note 120, at 240 (“Although no formal statistics are
available, my own calculations establish that the vast majority of immigration cases involved
review of a discretionary form of relief.”). After passage of the REAL ID Act of 2005,
aliens were no longer able to challenge their removals through a habeas petition; petitions for
review to the courts of appeals became the sole form of relief. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5); see
also 1 GORDON ET AL., supra note 22, § 2.04(22)(a).
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of discretionary decisions could be reviewed by federal courts in the wake
of IIRIRA. 137
E. Kucana v. Holder
In 2010, the Supreme Court’s decision in Kucana v. Holder 138 resolved
the circuit split over whether a regulation promulgated by the Attorney
General can remove discretionary decisions by the BIA from the review of
a federal court.
1. Factual Background of Kucana
Agron Kucana came to the United States from Albania in 1995 and
remained in the country after his business visa expired. 139 Kucana
subsequently applied for asylum and withholding of removal. 140 When
Kucana failed to appear for his removal hearing before an IJ, the judge
ordered him removed in absentia. 141 Kucana filed a motion to reopen,
which was denied by the IJ and affirmed by the BIA in 2002. 142
The BIA denied a second motion to reopen in 2006, and Kucana filed a
petition for review with the Seventh Circuit. 143 The Seventh Circuit panel
split on whether it could exercise jurisdiction over the petition, with the
majority holding that it could not. 144 While the majority conceded that the
discretion to grant or deny a motion to reopen was conferred on the BIA
through a regulation, it noted that this regulation drew its power “from
provisions in the Act allowing immigration officials to govern their own
137. See Benson, New World, supra note 120, at 255–56 (noting that jurisdiction would
be unclear both due to ambiguity in the statute and the question of whether habeas
jurisdiction provided a separate avenue for courts to review removal orders regardless of
Congress’s attempts to strip jurisdiction through IIRIRA). IIRIRA’s original provisions
prevented habeas review of removal proceedings, but the Supreme Court held that habeas
review survived IIRIRA. See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 297–98 (2001). After St. Cyr,
Congress passed the REAL ID Act of 2005, which eliminated habeas review. See generally 8
GORDON ET AL., supra note 22, § 104.04. As a result, habeas review will not be considered
in this Note. For an example of a rare case in which habeas review was allowed, see
Chehazeh v. Attorney General, 666 F.3d 118 (3d Cir. 2012).
138. 130 S. Ct. 827 (2010).
139. Kucana v. Mukasey, 533 F.3d 534, 535 (7th Cir. 2008).
140. Id.
141. Id. Kucana claimed that he had missed his hearing because he overslept. See id.
142. Id. At that time, Kucana did not seek judicial review, or leave the United States. See
id.
143. Kucana, 130 S. Ct. at 832–33; see also Kucana, 533 F.3d at 534. Kucana argued in
his second motion to reopen that conditions had worsened in Albania since his first hearing
before the IJ, but the BIA found that conditions in that country had actually improved since
1997. Kucana, 130 S. Ct. at 832–33. In a footnote, the Court noted that each alien is
guaranteed one motion to reopen by statute. See id. at 832 n.5 (citing Dada v. Mukasey, 128
S. Ct. 2307, 2308 (2008)). The Court further noted that additional motions are permitted by
regulation based on changed conditions in the country of nationality or removal. See id.
(citing 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) (2009)).
144. Kucana, 130 S. Ct. at 833; see also Kucana, 533 F.3d at 539. Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg noted that the split panel below had created a circuit split between the Seventh
Circuit and all other circuits, which had held that these motions were reviewable under
8 U.S.C. § 1252. See Kucana, 130 S. Ct. at 833.
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proceedings.” 145 Judge Kenneth Ripple concurred and acknowledged that
the circuit’s precedent in Ali v. Gonzales 146 compelled the court’s
judgment, but believed that the court should reconsider both Ali and
Kucana en banc to reevaluate whether Congress actually intended to
deprive the courts of the ability to review motions to reopen. 147 Judge
Richard Cudahy dissented, noting that, without any clear language denying
judicial review of motions to reopen, the court should follow the “strong
presumption” in favor of judicial review of administrative proceedings.148
The Seventh Circuit denied the petition for rehearing en banc. 149 The
Supreme Court granted certiorari on April 27, 2009.150
2. The Court’s Statutory Interpretation
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, writing for a unanimous Court, held that
the authority to grant or deny a motion to reopen was made discretionary by
a regulation, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a), and not 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), the
statute limiting judicial review of “any other decision or action of the
Attorney General . . . the authority for which is specified under this
subchapter to be in the discretion of the Attorney General.” 151 Justice
Ginsburg specifically rejected the Seventh Circuit’s argument that the
regulation “[drew] force” from statute because the regulation was enacted

145. Kucana, 533 F.3d at 536.
146. 502 F.3d 659 (7th Cir. 2007).
147. See Kucana, 533 F.3d at 539–40 (Ripple, J., concurring).
148. See id. at 541 (Cudahy, J., dissenting) (quoting Traynor v. Turnage, 485 U.S. 535,
542 (1988)).
149. See id. at 541–42 (Ripple, J., dissenting as to denial of rehearing en banc).
150. Kucana v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2075 (2009). Once certiorari was granted, the
Department of Justice abandoned the government’s position and declined to argue against
judicial review of motions to reopen. See Kucana, 130 S. Ct. 872, 833 (2010). The Court
appointed Amanda C. Leiter, a Professor at Catholic University of America’s Columbus
School of Law, to argue this side instead. See id.
151. Kucana v. Holder, 130 S. Ct. 827, 834 (2010). The statute reads in pertinent part:
No court shall have jurisdiction to review . . . any other decision or action of the
Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland Security the authority for which is
specified under this subchapter to be in the discretion of the Attorney General or
the Secretary of Homeland Security, other than the granting of relief under section
1158(a) of this title.
8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) (2006). The regulation reads in pertinent part:
The Board [of Immigration Appeals] may at any time reopen or reconsider on its
own motion any case in which it has rendered a decision. A request to reopen or
reconsider any case in which a decision has been made by the Board, which
request is made by the Service, or by the party affected by the decision, must be in
the form of a written motion to the Board. The decision to grant or deny a motion
to reopen or reconsider is within the discretion of the Board, subject to the
restrictions of this section. The Board has discretion to deny a motion to reopen
even if the party moving has made out a prima facie case for relief.
8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) (2011). A separate controversy exists over whether the “post-departure
bar” preventing appeals after removal is valid, but these cases have questioned 8 C.F.R.
§ 1003.2(d), a separate provision. See, e.g., Prestol Espinal v. Att’y Gen., 653 F.3d 213, 213
(3d Cir. 2011).
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prior to the passage of IIRIRA. 152 Counsel for the government argued that
the jurisdiction-stripping provision refers to “authority . . . specified under
this subchapter,” and that this provision could be read to say “pursuant to”
or “subordinate to,” a reading that would include regulations made by the
Attorney General during the course of carrying out § 1252’s
requirements. 153 The Court rejected this position in favor of the petitioner’s
view that § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) precludes judicial review when the statute
itself explicitly grants discretionary authority to the Attorney General, and
not when a decision is made discretionary by a regulation alone.154
The Court found the petitioner’s reading of § 1252 persuasive in light of
the other jurisdictional limitations found in § 1252(a)(2)(A) and (C). 155
Each of these relied solely on its own definitions and not on any external
regulation. 156 Because § 1252(a)(2)(B) was “sandwiched” between these
two other provisions, the Court read it within that context. 157 The Court
also considered that clause (i) of § 1252(a)(2)(B) specifically enumerated
five sections of the statute under which no court could review a final
judgment of the Attorney General—sections 1182(h), 1182(i), 1229b,
1229c, and 1255. 158 Each of these sections addresses a different form of
discretionary relief from removal. 159 The Court reasoned that these specific
statutory grants of discretion indicate that Congress intended to limit
judicial review under the immediately following clause (ii)—the question
before the Court—only in those cases specified in the statute.160 The Court
rejected a broader reading under which the use of the word “any” expanded
clause (ii) to exclude review of decisions made discretionary through
regulation. 161
Finally, the Court looked to the nature of the discretion granted in the
statute and the nature of motions to reopen to aid its interpretation of
§ 1252. The government asserted that the discretionary bases for decision
enumerated in the statute—waivers of inadmissibility based on criminal
offenses or fraud, cancellation of removal, permission for voluntary
departure, or adjustment of status—were “substantive decisions . . . made
by the Executive in the immigration context as a matter of grace, things that
involve whether aliens can stay in the country or not.” 162 The government
argued that these decisions, made through the “grace” of the Attorney
General, are discretionary immigration powers of the kind that are typically
152. See Kucana, 130 S. Ct. at 834 & n.9. Justice Ginsburg noted that 8 C.F.R.
§ 1003.2(a) was published on April 29, 1996, while 8 U.S.C. § 1229 was enacted on
September 30, 1996. Id.
153. See Kucana, 130 S. Ct. at 835.
154. See id. at 835–36.
155. See id. at 836.
156. Kucana, 130 S. Ct. at 836.
157. See id.
158. See id.
159. See id.
160. See id. at 836–37.
161. See id. at 837 n.14.
162. See id. at 837 (citing Transcript of Oral Argument at 14, Kucana, 130 S. Ct. 827
(2010) (No. 08-911)).
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unreviewable by the courts.163 The Court rejected this position, noting that
when a court reviews a denial of a motion to reopen, it does not ask the BIA
and the Attorney General to exercise any “grace,” but instead requires them
to provide a fair hearing. 164 The Court observed that had Congress wished
to extend the statutory discretion to include regulatory discretion, it “could
have easily said so.” 165
3. The Court’s Interpretation of IIRIRA’s Legislative History
The Court also considered the legislative history of IIRIRA in holding
that motions to reopen were not meant to fall outside of judicial review.166
The Court noted that IIRIRA affected motions to reopen in two separate
ways: first, by codifying the requirements for a motion to reopen, and
second, by barring judicial review of many types of removal decisions.167
What Congress did not do, the Court held, was codify the regulation
granting the BIA discretion to grant or deny motions to reopen.168 The
Court in Kucana saw this inaction as Congress’s intent to leave motions to
reopen in their pre-IIRIRA state—a broad discretion derived from
regulation, to grant or deny motions to reopen, with such discretion subject
to judicial review. 169 A decision to the contrary would give “the
Executive . . . a free hand to shelter its own decisions from abuse-ofdiscretion appellate court review.” 170 According to the Court, even the
subsequent amendment to the statute—the REAL ID Act of 2005 171—did
not change the source of authority in discretion over motions to reopen.172
Finally, the Court specifically reserved the question of whether sua
sponte motions to reopen are governed by this same reasoning. 173 In doing
so, the Court noted that the overwhelming pre-Kucana circuit authority
weighed against allowing judicial review of sua sponte motions to reopen

163. See id.
164. See id.
165. See id.
166. See id. at 838–39.
167. See id. at 838; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(c)(7) (2006) (codifying requirements for a
motion to reopen); Id. § 1252(a)(2) (limiting judicial review of certain discretionary BIA
decisions).
168. See Kucana, 130 S. Ct. at 838.
169. See id. at 838–39 (“It is unsurprising that Congress would leave in place judicial
oversight of this ‘important [procedural] safeguard’ designed ‘to ensure a proper and lawful
disposition’ of immigration proceedings, where, as here, the alien’s underlying claim (for
asylum) would itself be reviewable.” (quoting Dada v. Mukasey, 128 S. Ct. 2307, 2317–19
(2008))).
170. See id. at 840; see also Bryan Clark & Amanda C. Leiter, Regulatory Hide and Seek:
What Agencies Can (and Can’t) Do to Limit Judicial Review, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1687, 1692–
93 (2011) (arguing that when an agency uses regulations to clarify broad statutory language,
the agency may be attempting to immunize itself from judicial review).
171. Pub. L. 109-13, 119 Stat. 302 (2005) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8
and 49 U.S.C.).
172. See Kucana, 130 S. Ct. at 839.
173. See id. at 839 n.18.
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because the decision not to reopen “[was] committed to agency discretion
by law.” 174
4. The Presumption in Favor of Judicial Review
of Administrative Decisions
In its final salvo in favor of review of decisions made discretionary by
regulation, the Court noted the presumption in favor of such review in the
administrative context. 175 When a statute is susceptible to divergent
readings, the Court favors the interpretation that allows for judicial
review. 176 Because this presumption is “well-settled,” the Court presumed
that Congress wrote IIRIRA knowing that the Court would allow judicial
review if the statute was silent or ambiguous in regard to review of
administrative decisions. 177 It takes “clear and convincing evidence” to
overcome this presumption, which the Court did not find in this case.178 By
not clearly delegating final authority to the Attorney General, the Court
instead found that Congress intended for motions to reopen to remain
subject to judicial review.179
II. CIRCUIT COURT DECISIONS ON SUA SPONTE REVIEW AFTER KUCANA
The Court did not answer the question of whether sua sponte motions to
reopen were subject to judicial review, under the same reasoning applied in
Kucana to motions brought by the parties. Since Kucana, some circuits
have deferred to pre-Kucana holdings regarding jurisdiction to review sua
sponte motions, concluding that they lack jurisdiction and noting that
evaluation of the decision not to reopen sua sponte would be hollow
without a meaningful standard of review. Other circuits have noted that, in
light of Kucana, it may be time to reconsider circuit holdings that denied

174. Id. The Court cited Tamenut v. Mukasey, 521 F.3d 1000 (8th Cir. 2008), as an
example. See id. The ambiguity of the phrase “by law” and whether it can include the
regulation granting sua sponte authority will be discussed in Part II, infra.
175. See Kucana, 130 S. Ct. at 839 (citing Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno, 515 U.S.
417, 434 (1995)).
176. See id.
177. See id. (citing Reno v. Catholic Soc. Servs., Inc., 509 U.S. 43, 63–64 (1993)).
178. See id.
179. See id. at 839–40 (“Congress ensured that it, and only it, would limit the federal
courts’ jurisdiction . . . . While Congress pared back judicial review in IIRIRA, it did not
delegate to the Executive authority to do so.”). Justice Samuel Alito filed an opinion
concurring in the result but noting that the case could have been decided on narrower
statutory interpretation grounds. See id. at 840–41 (Alito, J., concurring). Justice Alito
argued that the language of 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii)—which refers to authority “under
this subchapter”—refers to subchapter II of Title 8, chapter 12, which consists of §§ 1151–
1381. See Kucana, 130 S. Ct. at 840. Subchapter II does not grant the Attorney General the
authority to make decisions discretionary through regulation. Id. Instead, as Justice Alito
noted, subchapter I grants this authority. See id.; see also 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1107. Because
the authority to make motions to reopen discretionary through statute stems from subchapter
I, Justice Alito argued that subchapter II’s limiting provisions cannot be said to circumvent
judicial review of motions to reopen. See Kucana, 130 S. Ct. at 841.
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jurisdiction over sua sponte motions, and to exercise jurisdiction over these
discretionary decisions.180
A. Circuits Denying Jurisdiction After Kucana
The First, Second, Third, Fifth, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits
have rejected jurisdiction over sua sponte motions to reopen, even after
Kucana. These circuits have relied on pre-Kucana case law to hold that the
decision to reopen sua sponte is purely discretionary and thus unreviewable
for two principal reasons: (1) Kucana did not overrule previous circuit
decisions on the issue of sua sponte reviewability, and (2) no meaningful
standard of review exists by which courts can review the decision not to
reopen sua sponte. 181
1. Circuits Using Kucana’s Bracketing of Sua Sponte Motions
to Deny Jurisdiction
In Neves v. Holder, 182 the First Circuit affirmed that pre-Kucana
precedent on sua sponte motions was still good law after the Kucana Court
declined to rule on the sua sponte issue, and thus the panel held that it did
not have jurisdiction. 183 The First Circuit had already ruled on Neves’s
case in 2009, but the Supreme Court vacated the First Circuit’s original
decision and remanded in the wake of Kucana.184 Neves, a Brazilian
citizen, had been found ineligible for asylum and withholding of removal in
2000. 185 Represented by a new attorney, Neves filed his first unsuccessful
motion to reopen in 2003, arguing that ineffective assistance of counsel had
led to his first unfavorable judgment. 186 The BIA denied this motion.187 In
2006, Neves filed a second motion to reopen based on another ineffective
assistance of counsel claim. 188 Finding that Neves had not shown diligence
in pursuing his claim, the BIA denied the motion and declined to reopen sua
sponte. 189
The First Circuit held that its first opinion in Neves’s case, where the
court found no jurisdiction over motions to reopen when brought by the
parties, was clearly erroneous after Kucana, because the Supreme Court’s
180. The Fourth Circuit has not addressed reviewability of the BIA’s decision not to
reopen sua sponte since the Kucana decision. For the pre-Kucana rule on review of the
decision not to reopen sua sponte, see Doh v. Gonzales, 193 F. App’x 245, 246 (4th Cir.
2006).
181. See, e.g., Neves v. Holder, 613 F.3d 30, 34–35 (1st Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S.
Ct. 3025 (2011); Ochoa v. Holder, 604 F.3d 546, 549–50 (8th Cir. 2010).
182. 613 F.3d 30.
183. See id. at 34–35.
184. See Neves v. Holder, 130 S. Ct. 3273, 3273 (2010); see also Neves v. Holder, 568
F.3d 41, 42–43 (1st Cir. 2009), vacated by Neves, 130 S. Ct. 3273. In that case, the First
Circuit had held that it lacked jurisdiction over a sua sponte motion to reopen. See id.
185. Neves, 613 F.3d at 33.
186. Id. at 33–34.
187. Id. at 34.
188. Id.; see supra note 29 and accompanying text.
189. Neves, 613 F.3d at 34.
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holding was directly contrary to the First Circuit’s earlier ruling. 190 The
First Circuit observed, however, that the Kucana decision did not upset
circuit precedent on whether sua sponte motions to reopen were subject to
this same line of reasoning. 191 The court noted that sua sponte decisions
were made discretionary through regulation, but cited to its earlier holding
in Luis v. INS 192 in concluding that it lacked jurisdiction. 193 In Luis, the
court had held that because motions to reopen were “committed to [the]
unfettered discretion” of the BIA through regulation, it could not exercise
jurisdiction. 194 Luis relied on Heckler v. Chaney, 195 a case where the
Supreme Court held that section 701(a)(2) of the Administrative Procedure
Act 196 (APA) places an agency decision beyond judicial review when
Congress grants the agency discretionary power and prescribes no
“meaningful manageable standards” for the authority. 197
In Gashi v. Holder, 198 the Second Circuit held that its pre-Kucana case
law on review of sua sponte motions to reopen was still binding
precedent. 199 Mustafe Gashi, a citizen of Yugoslavia, appealed the BIA’s
denial of his motion to reopen to the Second Circuit in 2009.200 In a brief
summary order, the court held that its previous rule in Ali v. Gonzales201
still governed sua sponte motions to reopen, and thus the court could not
review Gashi’s case. 202
In Ali, a citizen of Bangladesh petitioned the Second Circuit to review the
BIA’s decision denying his untimely motion to reopen—filed eleven years
after the BIA originally dismissed his case—and the decision to decline to
reopen sua sponte. 203 Ali argued that, although his motion was untimely,
his case presented “compelling and exceptional circumstances” that
190. See id. at 35.
191. See id.
192. 196 F.3d 36 (1st Cir. 1999).
193. See Neves, 613 F.3d at 35 (citing Luis, 196 F.3d at 40).
194. Luis, 196 F.3d at 40.
195. 470 U.S. 821 (1985).
196. 5 U.S.C. § 701 (2006).
197. See Heckler, 470 U.S. at 830; see also Luis, 196 F.3d at 40–41. Section 701(a)(2) of
the APA reads in pertinent part: “This chapter applies, according to the provisions thereof,
except to the extent that—(1) statutes preclude judicial review; or (2) agency action is
committed to agency discretion by law.” 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1)–(2) (2006). Luis applied
Heckler’s analysis to an agency inaction—the decision not to reopen sua sponte. See Luis,
196 F.3d at 40–41. For an argument that Heckler’s analysis should not apply to agency
inaction and that agency inaction should not be exempted from judicial review, see Lisa
Schultz Bressman, Judicial Review of Agency Inaction: An Arbitrariness Approach, 79
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1657, 1667–69 (2004).
198. 382 F. App’x 21 (2d Cir. 2010).
199. See id. at 22–23.
200. Id. at 22.
201. 448 F.3d 515 (2d Cir. 2006).
202. Gashi, 382 F. App’x at 23; see also Ali, 448 F.3d at 517. In Ali, the Second Circuit
noted that because sua sponte motions to reopen were committed to the BIA’s discretion by
regulation, these motions could not be reviewed by the court of appeals. See id. at 517–18.
This view was also expressed in Tavarez v. Holder, 422 F. App’x 19, 20–21 (2d Cir. 2011);
Hodzic v. Holder, 373 F. App’x 126, 128 (2d Cir. 2010); and Ruiz v. Holder, 374 F. App’x
170, 172–73 (2d Cir. 2010).
203. See Ali, 448 F.3d at 516.
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required the BIA to exercise its sua sponte authority. 204 The Second
Circuit, noting that this was a matter of first impression, looked to the First,
Third, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits, which had
determined that they lacked jurisdiction in such cases. 205 Among other
cases, the Second Circuit relied heavily on the Fifth Circuit’s decision in
Enriquez-Alvarado v. Ashcroft, 206 which held that the decision not to
reopen sua sponte was outside of the authority of courts to review,
regardless of whether discretion came from regulation or statute, because no
meaningful standard existed for courts to conduct a review of sua sponte
decisions. 207
In Ozeiry v. Attorney General, 208 the Third Circuit also applied preKucana precedent to conclude that it lacked jurisdiction over sua sponte
motions to reopen. 209 Hatem El Ozeiry, a citizen of Egypt, filed a motion
to reopen after an IJ found him removable. 210 The BIA denied this motion
in 2008, as well as a second motion to reopen that Ozeiry filed in 2009.211
In refusing jurisdiction over Ozeiry’s claim, the Third Circuit noted that the
Supreme Court in Kucana declined to rule on the sua sponte issue, and thus
did not affect the controlling pre-Kucana precedent holding that such
decisions were not reviewable.212
The Third Circuit’s recent decision in Chehazeh v. Attorney General 213
concerned an unusual situation in which a district court, and not a circuit,
reviewed the BIA’s decision to reopen sua sponte.214 Daoud Chehazeh
appealed the BIA’s decision to reopen sua sponte and reverse a 2001
decision to grant him asylum under 8 U.S.C. § 1158. 215 He initially
appealed to the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey to review
under habeas jurisdiction, and this application was denied. 216 On appeal,
the Third Circuit held that, under the particular facts of Chehazeh’s case,
the district court was entitled to review the decision to reopen sua sponte
under its habeas jurisdiction. 217 Since no removal order had been entered in
204. See id. at 517.
205. See id. at 518.
206. 371 F.3d 246 (5th Cir. 2004).
207. See Ali, 448 F.3d at 518; Enriquez-Alvarado, 371 F.3d at 249–50.
208. 400 F. App’x 647 (3d Cir. 2010).
209. See id. at 649–50.
210. Id. at 648. The motion to reopen was based on Ozeiry’s new marriage to a U.S.
citizen. See id. The Fifth and Tenth Circuits have determined that they lack such jurisdiction
using similar reasoning. See Bustillo-Martinez v. Holder, 431 F. App’x 265, 266–67 (5th
Cir. 2011) (holding that the decision not to reopen sua sponte is unreviewable because it
lacks a corresponding standard of review); Bakanovas v. Holder, 438 F. App’x 717, 722
(10th Cir. 2011) (citing Infanzon v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 1359, 1361 (10th Cir. 2004))
(refusing to review the BIA’s decision not to reopen sua sponte).
211. Ozeiry, 400 F. App’x at 648–49.
212. See id. at 649–50 (citing Cruz v. Att’y Gen., 452 F.3d 240, 249 (3d Cir. 2006)); see
also Calle-Vujiles v. Ashcroft, 320 F.3d 472, 475 (3d Cir. 2003). This view was affirmed in
Jia Ying Lin v. Att’y Gen., 421 F. App’x 241, 242 (3d Cir. 2011).
213. 666 F.3d 118 (3d Cir. 2012).
214. Id. at 125.
215. Id. at 122.
216. Id. at 124.
217. Id. at 125.
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the case, IIRIRA’s jurisdiction-stripping provisions did not apply, and thus
habeas jurisdiction remained intact. 218 Four factors informed the court’s
decision: the BIA’s decision was not committed to agency discretion by
law, no statute precluded review, the action was a final agency action, and
no “special statutory review” provision required that it be brought in
another forum. 219
The Third Circuit noted that review of a decision not to reopen would be
precluded under the Supreme Court’s analysis in Heckler v. Chaney, since
the decision not to reopen sua sponte was committed to agency discretion
by law and the BIA exercised no coercive power by deciding not to act.220
Taking action to open a case sua sponte, however, was not subject to this
same analysis, and thus could be reviewed by the circuit court.221
2. Circuits Finding No Meaningful Standard by Which
to Review the BIA’s Decision Not to Reopen Sua Sponte
In Ochoa v. Holder, 222 the Eighth Circuit reaffirmed its sua sponte
precedent in light of Kucana and denied jurisdiction over a BIA decision
not to reopen sua sponte. 223 In 2006, an IJ denied Ana Rosa Ochoa, a
Mexican citizen, her application for cancellation of removal. 224 In 2007,
Ochoa appealed on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel and asked
the BIA to reopen the case through its sua sponte authority. 225 On appeal,
the Eighth Circuit refused jurisdiction, noting that its decision in Tamenut v.
Mukasey 226 remained good law following Kucana and thus precluded
review. 227 In Tamenut, the Eighth Circuit panel had considered the lack of
a standard by which to review the sua sponte motion as evidence that this
decision was under the “unfettered authority” of the BIA and not subject to
judicial review. 228 Without a clear standard from Congress, the Eighth
Circuit had noted that any standard of review would have to be created by
the court without the guidance of the legislature.229 Thus, the decision to
218. Id. at 133.
219. Id. at 127.
220. Id. at 129 (citing Heckler, 470 U.S. at 832; Calle-Vujiles v. Ashcroft, 320 F.3d 472,
473–75 (3d Cir. 2003)).
221. Id. at 129.
222. 604 F.3d 546 (8th Cir. 2010).
223. See id. at 550.
224. Id. at 546–47.
225. Id. at 547–48. When Ochoa petitioned the Eighth Circuit, her petition did not clearly
specify whether it was a party’s motion to reopen or whether it was a request for the BIA to
exercise its sua sponte authority. Because Ochoa petitioned the BIA “pursuant to 8 C.F.R.
§ 1003.2(a)” to reopen “on their own [sic] motion,” the Eighth Circuit found that Ochoa had
petitioned the BIA to use its sua sponte authority. See id. at 549.
226. 521 F.3d 1000 (8th Cir. 2008).
227. See Ochoa, 604 F.3d at 549. Judge Clarence Arlen Beam, author of the dissent in
Tamenut, wrote for the majority in Ochoa. See id. at 546.
228. See Tamenut, 521 F.3d at 1004.
229. See id. (“The regulation itself, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a), provides no guidance as to the
BIA’s appropriate course of action, sets forth no factors for the BIA to consider in deciding
whether to reopen sua sponte, places no constraints on the BIA’s discretion, and specifies no
standards for a court to use to cabin the BIA’s discretion.”).
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reopen sua sponte was committed to the agency “by law” and was out of the
reach of judicial review. 230 Relying on this argument, the Ochoa court also
noted that under the Supreme Court’s holding in Heckler v. Chaney and the
APA, a court could not review the BIA’s decision not to invoke its sua
sponte authority because there was no law to apply. 231
In Jaimes-Aguirre v. U.S. Attorney General, 232 the Eleventh Circuit
affirmed Lenis v. U.S. Attorney General, 233 its pre-Kucana precedent on sua
sponte motions to reopen. 234 The opinion in Jaimes-Aguirre did not
analyze the jurisdictional question at length, deferring instead to Lenis.235
Lenis had relied on the APA, which prevents judicial review when a
decision is committed to agency discretion by law. 236 The court in Lenis
relied on Heckler to hold that without a meaningful statutory standard by
which to review sua sponte motions to reopen, a court could not consider
whether the BIA had properly applied its discretion. 237 The permissive
language of 5 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a), which grants the BIA the choice to
exercise sua sponte authority, also hindered the finding of a standard for
courts to use when reviewing. 238
B. Circuits Amenable to Reviewing Sua Sponte Motions to Reopen
Following Kucana, the Second, Third, Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits
have also denied jurisdiction over the BIA’s decision not to reopen sua
sponte, but have noted their willingness to find jurisdiction over these
decisions in various ways. These circuits have urged rehearing cases en
banc or exercised review over the BIA’s decision not to reopen sua sponte
when the BIA’s decision is based on a clearly erroneous interpretation of
the law.
1. Jurisdiction Based on Separation of Powers and Kucana’s Reasoning
Some circuit panels have used Kucana’s reasoning and separation of
powers arguments to urge circuits to adopt jurisdiction over the decision not
to reopen sua sponte. For example, in Gor v. Holder, 239 a Sixth Circuit
panel urged the circuit to reconsider its pre-Kucana precedent precluding

230. See id. at 1005. The court in Tamenut also addressed a due process claim under the
Fourteenth Amendment (which it found within its power to do), but found that Tamenut had
not brought a colorable claim. See id.
231. See Ochoa, 604 F.3d at 549–50.
232. 369 F. App’x 101 (11th Cir. 2010).
233. 525 F.3d 1291 (11th Cir. 2008).
234. See Jaimes-Aguirre, 369 F. App’x at 103. The Eleventh Circuit also followed this
view in Qing Yun Lin v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 429 F. App’x 889, 891–92 (11th Cir. 2011).
235. See Jaimes-Aguirre, 369 F. App’x at 103.
236. See Lenis, 525 F.3d at 1293 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (2006)).
237. See id. (citing Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 830 (1985)); see also Tamenut v.
Mukasey, 521 F.3d 1000, 1004 (8th Cir. 2008).
238. See Lenis, 525 F.3d at 1293–94.
239. 607 F.3d 180 (6th Cir. 2010).
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review of sua sponte motions to reopen. 240 Tushar Gor, a citizen of India,
was convicted of child abandonment under Ohio state law and was
scheduled for removal. 241 Gor filed an untimely petition for review and
appealed to the Sixth Circuit when the BIA declined to reopen his case
under its sua sponte authority. 242 Although the panel cited Kucana in
rejecting the government’s contention that 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2 could place
review of Gor’s motion to reopen outside of the purview of an Article III
court, it concluded that the circuit’s precedent still placed sua sponte
decisions not to reopen outside of its review. 243
The panel believed that the circuit’s pre-Kucana decisions should be
revisited. 244 The Sixth Circuit stated that Heckler should not be construed
to hold that an agency can strip an Article III court of jurisdiction through
regulation, as the government had argued. 245 Kucana had “soundly
rejected” that line of reasoning, 246 and affirmed Heckler so far as it held
that curtailment of judicial review of agency decisions must emanate from
Congress, and not the agency itself. 247 The Sixth Circuit also noted that
another line of reasoning drawn from Heckler’s holding—that without a
meaningful standard of review for the decision set by Congress, there can
be no judicial review—would mean that no agency decision could be
reviewable. 248 This would directly contradict Kucana’s holding. 249
The majority concluded by noting that Gor’s case provided a perfect
example of why discretionary BIA decisions should be reviewable and,
more generally, why all agency decisions should be reviewable.250 In Gor’s
original hearing, the IJ failed to provide him with a “list of free legal
service-providers” which, the Sixth Circuit noted, might have led to a
different outcome in his case. 251 The court also noted that the BIA
misunderstood the law regarding removals for those convicted of child
240. See id. at 182 (“[We] must conclude that we have no jurisdiction to review the denial
of the motion to reopen sua sponte, although the Supreme Court’s recent decision in
Kucana . . . casts considerable doubt on our circuit precedent that dictates that
result . . . . [We] urge the en banc court to reexamine the validity of our prior cases in this
area.”). In the Sixth Circuit, a panel decision remains controlling authority unless it is
overturned en banc or a Supreme Court decision renders it invalid. See Rutherford v.
Columbia Gas, 575 F.3d 616, 619 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Salmi v. Sec’y of Health &
Human Servs., 774 F.2d 685, 689 (6th Cir. 1985)).
241. Gor, 607 F.3d at 181.
242. Id. at 182. Gor argued in his petition to the Sixth Circuit that his actions amounted
to “non-support” instead of child abandonment, but failed to raise this and other claims
during the original appeal to the BIA. See id.
243. See id. at 186–87.
244. See id. at 187–88 (citing Barry v. Mukasey, 524 F.3d 721, 723–24 (6th Cir. 2008);
Harchenko v. INS, 379 F.3d 405, 410–11 (6th Cir. 2004)).
245. See id. at 188–89.
246. Id.
247. See id. at 189.
248. See id. at 189–90; Luis v. INS, 196 F.3d 36, 40 (1st Cir. 1999) (noting that
discretionary decisions were unreviewable where Congress had created no meaningful
standard by which the court could review the decision).
249. Gor, 607 F.3d at 190.
250. See id. at 193.
251. See id. at 191.

2102

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80

abuse or neglect crimes when it reviewed Gor’s claim. 252 According to the
Sixth Circuit panel, a lack of review of these discretionary decisions would
allow erroneous legal conclusions of the BIA to stand without any oversight
by the judiciary. 253
In Mejia-Hernandez v. Holder, 254 the Ninth Circuit also grudgingly
affirmed its pre-Kucana precedent of Ekimian v. INS, 255 and determined
that it lacked jurisdiction over a denial of a motion to reopen sua sponte.256
Bernardino Eduardo Mejia-Hernandez, a citizen of Guatemala, applied for
asylum in 1993 but was ordered deported in absentia. 257 Mejia-Hernandez
and his wife had employed Bryan Ramos, who falsely represented himself
as an attorney, for seven years. 258 Once Mejia-Hernandez and his wife
discovered that Ramos was not an attorney, they retained new counsel and
Mejia-Hernandez filed a motion to reopen in 2005. 259 The IJ reopened sua
sponte and granted relief under section 203(c) of the Nicaraguan
Adjustment and Central American Relief Act 260 (NACARA). The BIA
overturned the IJ’s decision to review sua sponte, and Mejia appealed to the
Ninth Circuit. 261
Although bound by precedent, the Ninth Circuit panel noted that “[t]he
overall thrust of Kucana suggests that sua sponte reopening should be
subject to review” and noted that if the question were one of first
impression, the court might be open to finding jurisdiction over the
question. 262 Under Ekimian, sua sponte decisions were not reviewable
because they lacked any clear standard by which to review them—meaning
that they had been committed to agency discretion by law. 263 The panel
noted that this was at odds with Kucana’s reasoning; where the Ekimian
court was searching for an affirmative standard by which to review sua
sponte authority, the Kucana Court sought clear statutory language that
placed motions to reopen outside of judicial review. 264 However, without

252. See id. at 192–93.
253. See id. at 193.
254. 633 F.3d 818 (9th Cir. 2011).
255. 303 F.3d 1153 (9th Cir. 2002).
256. Mejia-Hernandez, 633 F.3d at 823–24.
257. Id. at 820–21.
258. Id. at 821.
259. Id.
260. Id. NACARA allows for special dispensation of removal claims for aliens seeking
asylum from civil wars and political events in Nicaragua, Guatemala, El Salvador, and the
former Soviet Republics. See Pub. L. No. 105-100, tit. II, 111 Stat. 2160 (1997) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.); LEGOMSKY & RODRÍGUEZ, supra note 25, at 624.
261. Mejia-Hernandez, 633 F.3d at 822. The Ninth Circuit considered whether it had
jurisdiction over the BIA’s decision to overturn the IJ’s sua sponte motion to reopen in light
of Kucana and prior circuit precedent. See id. at 823.
262. Id. (“There is a longstanding tradition of judicial review of reopenings in
immigration cases; there is no statute suggesting review is not available; there is a
presumption favoring review; and there is a separation-of-powers concern against giving the
Executive authority to withhold cases from judicial review.”).
263. Id; see also Ekimian v. INS, 303 F.3d 1153, 1159 (9th Cir. 2002).
264. See Mejia-Hernandez, 633 F.3d at 823.
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any changes in the law since Ekimian, the Mejia-Hernandez court ruled that
it could not review the BIA’s decision not to reopen sua sponte. 265
Other Ninth Circuit decisions lend support to the call to reconsider
Ekimian’s holding. In ANA International, Inc. v. Way, 266 the court held that
analysis of judicial review through the APA is inapplicable where IIRIRA’s
more specific provisions govern. 267 The court also noted that only in “rare
instances where statutes are drawn in such broad terms that in a given case
there is no law to apply” would analysis through the APA be necessary.268
The Ninth Circuit also noted in Spencer Enterprises v. United States 269 that
analysis under the APA can be avoided when agency practice and
regulations create a standard for reviewing an agency’s decisions for which
Congress has not provided a meaningful standard of review through
statute. 270
2. Jurisdiction Because a Standard Exists by Which
to Review the Decision Not to Reopen
Some circuits have found jurisdiction where the BIA’s decision not to
reopen sua sponte is based on a misinterpretation of law. In Mahmood v.
Holder, 271 the Second Circuit reviewed the BIA’s decision not to review
sua sponte and remanded the case to the BIA for further proceedings due to
the BIA’s misinterpretation of the relevant law. 272 Tahir Mohammad
Mahmood, a citizen of Pakistan, moved to reopen his removal proceedings
based on his marriage to a U.S. citizen. 273 The BIA denied his motion, and
declined to reopen under its sua sponte authority. 274 The Second Circuit
held that while Ali’s precedent prevented the court from reviewing the
decision not to reopen sua sponte, sua sponte decisions were reviewable
where the BIA relied on a misinterpretation of the relevant law in making
its decision. 275 The Second Circuit noted that, on remand, the BIA would
still be free to ignore the Second Circuit’s urging to reopen sua sponte, and
that such a decision would then be unreviewable. 276
In Pllumi v. Attorney General, 277 the Third Circuit likewise held that
where the BIA’s decision not to grant a sua sponte motion to reopen was
based on a fundamental misunderstanding of law, the court of appeals had
265. See id. at 823–24.
266. 393 F.3d 886 (9th Cir. 2004).
267. Id. at 890.
268. Id. at 890–91 (citing Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 830 (1985)).
269. 345 F.3d 683 (9th Cir. 2003).
270. Id. at 691.
271. 570 F.3d 466 (2d Cir. 2009).
272. See id. at 471.
273. Id. at 467.
274. Id.
275. See id. at 469. The BIA had incorrectly interpreted whether the filing of a motion to
reopen automatically tolled the period for voluntary departure, in part because the Supreme
Court had not yet decided Dada v. Mukasey, 128 S. Ct. 2307 (2008). See Mahmood, 570
F.3d at 469–71.
276. See id. at 471.
277. 642 F.3d 155 (3d Cir. 2011).
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the authority to review the BIA’s decision. 278 An IJ had denied Tonin
Pllumi, a citizen of Albania, withholding of removal in 2002. 279 The BIA
upheld the ruling in 2007, and declined to grant Pllumi’s motion to reopen
or exercise its own sua sponte authority in 2009. 280 Pllumi claimed that he
would be subject to persecution if returned to Albania because of his
religious and political beliefs. 281 His motion to reopen also cited the
inability of the Albanian healthcare system to treat injuries that he sustained
in a hit-and-run accident. 282
The Pllumi court noted that the sua sponte authority, made discretionary
by regulation, lies solely with the BIA and is usually unreviewable.283 In
this case, however, the Third Circuit adopted the Second Circuit’s rule in
Mahmood: when the BIA has declined to exercise sua sponte authority
based on a misunderstanding of the law, the court of appeals has the
authority to review the decision and remand back to the BIA, which would
still possess discretion over whether to exercise its sua sponte authority.284
The Third Circuit vacated the BIA’s order and remanded Pllumi’s case,
holding that the BIA had mistakenly believed that the quality of healthcare
in Albania was not “other serious harm” under 8 C.F.R.
§ 1208.13(b)(1)(iii)(B). 285
Prior to Kucana, one circuit judge had also proposed review based on
“exceptional circumstances.” In response to the argument that the lack of a
standard precluded review of the decision not to reopen sua sponte, Judge
Clarence Arlen Beam, dissenting from the Eighth Circuit’s decision in
Tamenut, argued that administrative law recognizing sua sponte review in
“exceptional circumstances” and case law explaining when “exceptional
circumstances” occur could provide a meaningful standard of review for
courts to utilize.286 Judge Beam conceded that this deferential standard
might lead federal courts to affirm the BIA in most cases, but noted that
“[t]he critical factor . . . is that review is proper.”287
III. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF SUA SPONTE MOTIONS TO REOPEN
THROUGH KUCANA’S REASONING
The Supreme Court’s holding in Kucana specifically reserved the issue
of whether the decision not to reopen sua sponte was subject to judicial
278. See id. at 159–60.
279. Id. at 157.
280. Id. at 157–58.
281. Id. at 157.
282. Id. at 158.
283. See id. at 159–60 (citing Calle-Vujiles v. Ashcroft, 320 F.3d 472, 474–75 (3d Cir.
2003)).
284. See id.; see also Mahmood v. Holder, 570 F.3d 466, 469 (2d Cir. 2009).
285. See Pllumi, 642 F.3d at 163. Had this been “other serious harm,” there would have
been grounds for relief from his removal, making Pllumi’s inability to seek treatment for his
injuries if removed a factor worthy of consideration by the BIA. Id.
286. See Tamenut v. Mukasey, 521 F.3d 1000, 1006 (8th Cir. 2008) (Beam, J.,
dissenting).
287. Id. at 1006–07.
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review. 288 The circuit courts have subsequently shown division on this
issue, with some circuits holding fast to pre-Kucana case law, while others
call for these cases to be revisited in light of Kucana. This Note argues that
Kucana’s analysis should allow for judicial review of the BIA’s decision
not to reopen sua sponte.
Part III.A argues that courts should review the BIA’s decision not to
reopen sua sponte, both because this power is granted to the BIA through
regulation and because the courts can apply a meaningful standard of
review to these cases. Part III.B argues that judicial review of the decision
not to reopen sua sponte is in line with the Court’s historical move toward
greater review of executive immigration decisions within the plenary power
doctrine.
A. Review of Sua Sponte Motions to Reopen Follows
from Kucana’s Reasoning
Because the BIA’s sua sponte power is derived from regulation,289 it
should be subject to the same review as party motions to reopen. Circuit
courts should use the BIA’s own “exceptional circumstances” standard to
review the decision not to review sua sponte in order to ensure fair hearings
for aliens before the BIA.
1. Sua Sponte Power Should Be Subject to Review by the Courts
In Kucana, the Supreme Court held that when a decision of the Attorney
General (or the BIA) is made discretionary by statute, courts may not
review that decision. 290 Sua sponte authority is not granted by statute, but
by the same regulation at issue in Kucana. 291 Without explicit statutory
language granting the power to reopen sua sponte, the decision not to
reopen should not evade Kucana’s reasoning: a power made discretionary
by regulation alone cannot be removed from review of the courts.
The authority to reopen, whether on motion by the parties or sua sponte
power, is an important discretionary power used to ensure a fair proceeding.
Unlike most substantive immigration powers, which are reserved for
Congress and the Executive under the plenary power doctrine, sua sponte
motions to reopen represent a power exercised as part of the due process
required during an immigration proceeding. 292 In this sense, the decision
not to reopen sua sponte is the same as the decision not to reopen on a
motion brought by a party in the case. As a result, under Kucana’s
reasoning, both should be reviewable. When new facts or evidence become
available, and the strict ninety-day window imposed by IIRIRA for filing a
motion to reopen has passed, asking the BIA to exercise its sua sponte
power fills the same role as a motion to reopen during the ninety-day
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.

Kucana v. Holder, 130 S. Ct. 827, 839 n.18 (2010); see also supra Part I.E.
See supra note 63–64 and accompanying text.
See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) (2011)).
See supra notes 162–65 and accompanying text.
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window: to correct the record and evaluate the original decision in the light
of this new evidence. 293
The distinction between agency action and inaction should not preclude
review of the decision not to reopen sua sponte. When the BIA decides not
to reopen sua sponte, its decision still has major consequences for an alien
seeking to remain in this country, and is an exercise of “coercive power” in
the sense that the Heckler Court held would merit judicial review. 294 The
Court in Kucana made no distinction between agency action and inaction,
considering the decision not to grant Kucana’s motion to reopen as an
example of agency action. 295 Thus, even if the decision not to reopen sua
sponte is deemed agency inaction, this status alone should not preclude
review under Kucana’s reasoning.
Review of the decision not to reopen sua sponte is also in line with the
Court’s interpretation of congressional intent in IIRIRA. The Court found
that Congress codified the requirements of the motion to reopen, but did not
codify the Attorney General’s power to grant or deny these motions.296
The Court found that IIRIRA’s silence on motions to reopen, in the midst of
specific carve-outs and limits on judicial review, meant that Congress did
not intend to exclude motions to reopen from judicial review. 297 Similarly,
Congress could have chosen to codify the Attorney General’s discretion
over sua sponte motions to reopen or specifically shield these decisions
from judicial review. 298 Such language in the statute would have shown
Congress’s clear intent to place the decision not to reopen sua sponte
outside of the purview of the courts. Congress’s silence should not be
construed to allow the Executive Branch the power to declare itself beyond
judicial oversight. 299 Doing so would equate congressional silence with the
delegation to the Executive of the authority to alter the jurisdiction of the
federal judiciary. 300 In the face of Congress’s silence, sua sponte motions
should also be subject to judicial review.
The Kucana Court’s final argument in favor of judicial review, the broad
presumption in favor of review of administrative decisions, should also
apply to sua sponte motions to reopen. The Court’s well-settled policy of
favoring judicial review where a jurisdiction-stripping provision is
ambiguous puts Congress on notice that its silence will be construed,
wherever possible, as allowing for judicial review of an agency decision.301
In Kucana, the Court construed Congress’s silence in IIRIRA to find
judicial review of these decisions proper.302 A similar analysis of
293. See supra notes 58–66 and accompanying text.
294. See supra note 220 and accompanying text. See generally Bressman, supra note 197.
295. See Kucana v. Holder, 130 S. Ct. 827, 840 (2010).
296. Id. at 838; see also supra note 168 and accompanying text.
297. See Kucana, 130 S. Ct. at 837–38 .
298. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
299. See supra notes 169–69 and accompanying text.
300. See Clark & Leiter, supra note 170, at 1698–1704 (discussing nondelegation and
judicial review of agency discretion).
301. See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
302. See supra notes 175–79 and accompanying text.
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Congress’s silence on sua sponte motions to reopen also invites the
presumption that judicial review of these decisions should be allowed. This
distinction should apply regardless of whether a court is reviewing an
exercise of discretion or the decision not to exercise that discretion. 303 The
important distinction is whether discretion has been granted through statute
or regulation, not whether the court is reviewing an action or lack of action.
2. Courts Can Find a Meaningful Standard by which to Review Sua Sponte
Decisions
While the question of whether the decision to reopen sua sponte is made
discretionary by statute or by regulation may appear to be a simple one, the
question of whether a meaningful standard of review exists by which to
evaluate this decision is more complex. Some circuit courts denying
review—the Eighth and Eleventh Circuits—have relied on both the APA
and the Supreme Court’s decision in Heckler v. Chaney to find that the
BIA’s decision not to reopen sua sponte is “committed to agency discretion
by law” because Congress has supplied no meaningful standard by which to
review these decisions, making any review of the decision not to reopen sua
sponte meaningless. 304 In Tamenut, for example, the Eighth Circuit held
that, under Heckler, any standard of review would be meaningless because
courts would create it without guidance from Congress. 305
The Heckler-APA line of reasoning should not apply for two reasons.
First, the APA’s general provisions precluding judicial review are
superseded by IIRIRA’s specific provisions that either strip judicial review
or leave it intact. 306 The Ninth Circuit in ANA International, in finding the
APA inapplicable where more specific IIRIRA provisions governed, noted
that the APA only applied in “rare instances where statutes are drawn in
such broad terms that in a given case there is no law to apply.” 307 Motions
to reopen are not drawn so broadly as to have no law to apply, because case
law created by the BIA and statutory provisions for motions to reopen
brought by the parties can provide standards by which to review the
decision not to reopen sua sponte.308 The Ninth Circuit also noted in
Spencer Enterprises that agency practice and regulations can inform
judicial review of an agency decision where Congress has not provided a
meaningful standard of review through statute.309 Because IIRIRA’s
guidelines provide the analysis for motions to reopen, the APA should be
inapplicable. Even if 8 C.F.R § 1003.2(a), the regulation granting sua
sponte authority, were so broad as to make review less meaningful, BIA
303. See Bressman, supra note 197, at 1697 (arguing that a decision by an agency not to
act should be reviewable unless there is clear statutory language to the contrary).
304. See Ochoa v. Holder, 604 F.3d 546, 549 (8th Cir. 2010); James-Aguirre v. Att’y
Gen., 369 F. App’x 101, 103 (11th Cir. 2010).
305. See supra note 229 and accompanying text.
306. See supra note 268 and accompanying text.
307. ANA Int’l, Inc. v. Way, 393 F.3d 886, 890–91 (9th Cir. 2004)
308. See supra notes 270, 282–87 and accompanying text.
309. See supra note 270 and accompanying text.
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practices could inform the standards that courts use to review these
decisions. 310
Second, the Court in Kucana squarely rejected the inference from
Heckler that agencies could place themselves outside the purview of the
courts through regulation where Congress had not acted.311 In Gor, the
Sixth Circuit noted that its precedential case on sua sponte motions to
reopen—Harchenko—relied on Heckler, the APA, and the now flawed
premise that an agency could use Heckler to justify removing itself from the
jurisdiction of the federal courts without an act of Congress. 312 Chief Judge
Alice Batchelder, in her concurring opinion in Gor, justified continued
adherence to that premise on the basis that sua sponte authority was created
by regulation alone and not codified in statute; thus, she argued that an alien
had no right to a sua sponte reopening and no right to have this decision
reviewed by a court. 313 This argument fails because motions to reopen by
the parties were not created by regulation either. IIRIRA merely codified a
pre-existing procedural remedy. 314 Creation by regulation alone does not
distinguish the power to reopen upon a party’s motion from the power to do
so sua sponte. Therefore, Kucana and its reasoning should be the
applicable standard for determining jurisdiction to review sua sponte
motions to reopen, not Heckler and the APA.
Although courts sympathetic to Heckler’s analysis point to the lack of a
meaningful standard, a few potential standards can be gleaned from relevant
case law. One standard that courts could apply is to review sua sponte
denials when the BIA misinterprets the relevant law.315 In Mahmood, the
Second Circuit noted that the BIA’s decision would be reviewable when it
was based on a misunderstanding of the applicable law, regardless of circuit
precedent prohibiting review of the decision not to reopen sua sponte.316 In
Pllumi, the Third Circuit adopted the Mahmood standard and vacated the
BIA’s order declining to review sua sponte based on an erroneous
interpretation of the law. 317 This standard focuses on the issue of whether
the BIA has correctly interpreted the law that it is charged with applying, an
issue that is tangentially related to the exercise of sua sponte power itself.
A mistake of law standard, however, would still not allow for review of a
decision not to reopen sua sponte where the BIA had applied the correct
interpretation of law in a manner that led to an unjust outcome.
Therefore, the strongest standard would be one that reviews sua sponte
motions to reopen for the existence of “exceptional circumstances” under an
abuse of discretion standard. The BIA uses “exceptional circumstances” as
its own test for when to exercise its sua sponte power, and the body of law

310.
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.

See supra notes 286–87 and accompanying text.
See supra note 246 and accompanying text.
See id.
Gor v. Holder, 607 F.3d 180, 194–95 (6th Cir. 2010) (Batchelder, C.J., concurring).
See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 271–85 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 271–76 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 277–82 and accompanying text.
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created by the BIA can inform courts as to its meaning. 318 In fact,
Congress has defined “exceptional circumstances” for removal proceedings
in IIRIRA at 8 U.S.C. § 1229a, although not specifically in the section
governing motions to reopen. 319 Although an exceptional circumstances
test applied through an abuse of discretion standard might lead to
affirmation of the BIA’s decision not to reopen in most cases, judicial
review of this decision still provides an important procedural safeguard that
ensures a fair proceeding before the BIA. 320
Some may argue that reviewing the decision not to reopen sua sponte
under such lenient standards requires precious judicial resources that are
better spent elsewhere. Yet in their study of the large increase in petitions
for review to the courts of appeals in the early 2000s, John Palmer, Stephen
Yale-Loehr, and Elizabeth Cronin noted that denial of a motion to reopen or
reconsider was “likely to be appealed at a much lower rate than decisions in
appeals directly from IJs.” 321 Reviews of decisions not to reopen sua
sponte most likely represent a small subset of the petitions for review filed
each year, in part because the courts of appeals would apply an “abuse of
discretion” standard that makes review of the decision not to reopen
potentially less fruitful than a petition for review of the underlying BIA
decision itself.322 Adding a relatively small proportion of all removal cases
to the federal docket will not create a drag on the efficiency of the judicial
system, and review in these cases ensures a fair proceeding for all aliens
facing removal.
B. Review of Sua Sponte Motions to Reopen as Part of the Court’s Move
Toward Judicial Review of Immigration Proceedings
Until the 1950s, the plenary power doctrine and its demand of deference
to the Executive in immigration matters limited the Supreme Court’s reach
into immigration policy. 323 Since then, the Supreme Court has moved
toward finding room within the plenary powers doctrine for due process and
fair hearings in immigration proceedings. 324 In Mathews, the case that
created the due process standard for administrative proceedings, one of the
factors put forward by the Court was the risk of mistake due to inadequate
procedures. 325 The Mathews Court was concerned that an overemphasis on
speed and efficiency was leading to unjust decisions in administrative

318. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
319. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(e) (2006).
320. See Palmer, Yale-Loehr, & Cronin, supra note 132, at 38 n.202 (citing Oh v.
Gonzales, 406 F.3d 611, 612 (9th Cir. 2005); Khouzam v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 161, 165 (2d
Cir. 2004)) (noting that circuits may use an “abuse of discretion” standard when reviewing
the decision to reopen, but will utilize a higher standard when reviewing the decision on the
merits).
321. Palmer et al., supra note 132, at 38–39.
322. Id.
323. See supra notes 102–03 and accompanying text.
324. See supra notes 104–12 and accompanying text.
325. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
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hearings. 326 With increased judicial criticism of the BIA and a swell of
appeals to the circuit courts, 327 review of sua sponte decisions would create
a deterrent against inadequate and unjust proceedings before the BIA. An
increasing number of petitions for review creates the risk that fast decisions
will trump the right ones. Even if judicial review only occurs in a small
number of cases, the threat of this review would provide the impetus for the
BIA to ensure fair and thorough decisions if it wishes to avoid the watchful
eye of the courts.
In Plasencia, the Court required procedural due process in proceedings
for returning immigrants, and opened the door for review of immigration
proceedings that did not meet this due process standard. 328 The Plasencia
Court recognized that when an alien is present in the United States, his
relationship with the United States is fundamentally different from an
immigrant who has not yet entered, and thus he is entitled to due process in
the hearing to remove him. 329 As noted in Kucana, motions to reopen for
aliens in the United States are an important part of ensuring a “reasonable
hearing.” 330 Without review of sua sponte motions to reopen, aliens could
be subject to removal orders even where exceptional circumstances exist,
potentially leading to an outcome in conflict with the procedural due
process required by Plasencia. Kucana represented another step in the
progression toward greater judicial review by allowing review of motions to
reopen when brought by the parties. Without any clear statutory prohibition
from Congress, judicial review of the decisions not to reopen sua sponte
follows from the Court’s established policy of favoring basic due process
for aliens in immigration proceedings.
CONCLUSION
The federal immigration apparatus is meant to provide for fair and
speedy adjudications when an alien is subject to removal. Although they
are not beneficiaries of all of the Constitution’s protections, these potential
Americans are entitled to basic due process rights when their ability to
remain in this country is being decided. While judicial review of BIA
decisions certainly adds time to the process of removal, the speed of a
decision does not make it right. In passing IIRIRA, Congress set out certain
categories of decisions that were not subject to review in an attempt to
speed up the removal process. Where Congress was silent, however, the
strong presumption in favor of judicial review should apply.
In Kucana, the Court applied that presumption to allow for judicial
review of motions to reopen brought by the parties. The Court held that an
agency could not unilaterally declare itself insulated from judicial review
through a regulation. The BIA’s decision not to reopen sua sponte should
be subject to the same reasoning. Even under a lenient standard, courts can
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.

See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 341–42 (1976).
See supra notes 104–08 and accompanying text.
See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
See id.
Kucana v. Holder, 130 S. Ct. 827, 837 (2010).
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and should be able to provide a meaningful review of this decision. Judicial
review of the decision not to reopen sua sponte would be an important tool
for the circuit courts to ensure that proceedings before the BIA are fair.
Using review to give potential Americans a fair decision, and not just a fast
one, is an ideal worthy of the place that they hope to call home.

